Belief is not directly voluntary

One influential argument against certain forms of theism begins with an observation about the nature of belief: people cannot normally choose their beliefs at will. A person can choose to raise a hand, repeat a sentence, attend a religious service, or read a book. But a person cannot simply decide, in the same direct way, to believe that the book is true, that a historical event occurred, or that God exists. Belief generally follows what appears credible to the believer.

The argument is often connected with debates about divine hiddenness and religious nonbelief, especially in the work of J. L. Schellenberg. Its central concern is not merely that some people lack religious belief. It is that, if a perfectly loving God makes salvation depend on believing certain propositions, then the condition appears to depend on something people do not directly control. A person may sincerely investigate religious claims and remain unconvinced. Punishing or excluding such a person would seem morally arbitrary unless the doctrine distinguishes involuntary nonbelief from culpable rejection of evidence.

The strongest form of the argument

The argument should not be stated as the crude claim that beliefs are entirely unrelated to choice. Serious philosophers generally recognise a distinction between direct and indirect control. Direct control would involve deciding to believe something immediately, as one decides to stand up or open a door. Indirect control involves choosing activities that may later affect belief: examining evidence, seeking advice, changing one's intellectual habits, joining a community, or deliberately exposing oneself to considerations one has previously ignored.

The strongest version therefore runs as follows:

  • Belief is not normally subject to direct voluntary control. A person cannot sincerely believe a proposition merely by commanding herself to believe it.
  • Religious belief is, for many people, determined by what seems true after conscientious reflection, together with background experience, education, temperament, and access to evidence.
  • Some people who lack religious belief are not resisting evidence that they recognise as decisive. They may have considered the arguments seriously and still find them unpersuasive.
  • If a just and loving God makes a person's ultimate moral standing depend on religious belief, then such people would face an important consequence for a condition they could not directly choose.
  • Therefore, doctrines that treat sincere, non-resistant nonbelief as culpable appear morally incoherent, or at least require a substantial explanation of why this consequence is just.

This is not an argument that religious believers are irrational. Nor does it assume that atheists have examined every argument fairly. It concerns cases in which a person is genuinely open to truth, has made a reasonable effort to investigate, and nevertheless does not find theistic belief justified. In those cases, the person cannot manufacture conviction simply because the stakes are high.

William James's discussion of religious belief is relevant here, although James did not simply endorse the claim that all belief is voluntary. In The Will to Believe, he argued that certain practical and existential decisions may properly be made when evidence is not conclusive. This suggests an important complication: believing is not always a purely passive response to evidence. A person's practical commitments, trust, emotional orientation, and willingness to live within a possibility can influence what becomes believable. But James's position still does not amount to the claim that one can believe any proposition on command.

Why the argument has real force

The argument identifies a genuine difficulty for simplistic accounts of religious responsibility. Telling an unconvinced person to "just believe" confuses assent with action. A person who says, "I believe that God exists" while inwardly judging the claim false has not necessarily acquired the relevant belief. At most, the person has produced a statement or adopted a practice.

The distinction also matters morally. We ordinarily distinguish between refusing to acknowledge evidence because of pride, fear, or self-interest, and failing to be convinced despite honest attention. A juror who ignores decisive evidence may be blameworthy. A juror who considers the evidence carefully but remains uncertain is not blameworthy merely because the verdict did not arrive by choice. Extending this distinction to religious nonbelief is plausible.

Some theistic philosophers accept much of this. They may argue that culpability concerns not bare nonbelief but a person's response to truth: deliberate evasion, intellectual dishonesty, or a settled refusal to consider relevant evidence. This concedes the main point about direct control while relocating responsibility to voluntary conduct surrounding belief.

The argument also supports a significant version of the divine-hiddenness challenge. If a loving God wants a relationship with every person who is capable of such a relationship, then the existence of sincere, non-resistant nonbelievers requires explanation. Their lack of belief is not obviously the result of hostility. It can arise from ambiguous evidence, different religious environments, psychological history, or an honest assessment that the available arguments do not establish the conclusion. The mere fact that belief is important does not make it voluntary.

The strongest reply

The strongest reply does not deny the psychological point. Instead, it argues that direct voluntariness is not necessary for responsibility. Many things that are not directly chosen are still shaped by voluntary conduct. A person cannot instantly become courageous, trustworthy, or knowledgeable by decision alone. Yet a person can be responsible for repeatedly avoiding opportunities to learn, cultivating dishonest habits, or placing herself in environments designed to confirm what she already wants to believe.

Applied to religion, a theist may say that people are not condemned merely for lacking an involuntary mental state. They are judged for their total response to truth and moral reality. Persistent indifference, motivated reasoning, resentment, or refusal to investigate might be voluntary even if the resulting belief is not. On this account, "belief" is shorthand for a larger orientation of the person, not a proposition selected by an isolated act of will.

This reply has genuine strength. It is true that human cognition is not passive in every relevant respect. People choose what to attend to, whom to trust, which objections to investigate, and whether to revise cherished commitments. Beliefs can be influenced indirectly over time. Moreover, the fact that a final conviction is involuntary does not by itself show that no earlier choices contributed to it.

There is also a practical argument. Some theists, following a line associated with Pascal, may contend that a person can begin religious practices, prayer, or communal life before full conviction, and that belief may develop through those practices. This is a claim about indirect formation rather than a demand for instantaneous self-deception. It may be reasonable in some cases, though it cannot guarantee belief and should not be confused with evidence that the belief is true.

Limits of the reply

The reply becomes inadequate if it treats every nonbeliever as secretly culpable. Human beings can be mistaken without being negligent, and they can investigate sincerely without reaching the expected conclusion. Disagreement among thoughtful, informed people is itself evidence that the issue is not always settled by an obvious duty to accept theism.

Nor does indirect influence amount to full control. A person may choose to read, pray, or participate in a religious community and still remain unconvinced. If the final condition is required for salvation, the justice of the requirement cannot be established merely by showing that some preparatory actions are voluntary. The question remains whether the person is responsible for an intellectual outcome that she could not guarantee.

Religious doctrines also differ considerably. Some traditions or theologians make explicit belief central. Others give greater weight to moral character, conscience, practice, divine judgment, or degrees of knowledge and responsibility. Consequently, the argument does not refute "theism" as a whole. It targets doctrines that make ultimate destiny depend on belief in a way that ignores involuntary nonbelief.

What the argument establishes

The argument establishes an important constraint on a morally credible account of religious responsibility: it must distinguish direct nonbelief from culpable rejection, and it must take seriously the possibility of sincere, non-resistant nonbelief. It also exposes the weakness of popular claims that anyone can believe simply by choosing to do so.

It does not establish atheism. The involuntary character of belief does not show that theism is false, and it does not show that no form of divine judgment could be just. A theist may consistently maintain that judgment concerns voluntary intellectual and moral conduct, or that divine justice takes account of a person's evidence, circumstances, and sincerity.

Nor does the argument show that evidence is irrelevant to belief. Its more defensible conclusion is narrower: where belief is not directly voluntary, any doctrine that assigns ultimate blame for nonbelief must explain what voluntary failure grounds that blame. That is a serious philosophical demand. The argument succeeds when it rejects simplistic moral condemnation of the unconvinced; it remains inconclusive against theism until it shows that every plausible account of indirect responsibility and divine judgment fails.