Meaning May Be Something Humans Create Rather Than Discover

The claim that meaning is created rather than discovered is one of the central existentialist responses to nihilism. It begins with a denial: the universe may not contain a universal purpose that human beings are required to uncover. There may be no cosmic assignment, no built-in human essence, and no final explanation that tells each person what to love, serve, or become. Yet existentialists argue that this need not make life meaningless. Meaning can arise through freedom, commitment, love, work, creativity, solidarity, and sustained devotion to projects that a person has chosen.

This position is associated, in different forms, with thinkers such as Friedrich Nietzsche, Jean-Paul Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, and Albert Camus. They do not all mean the same thing by "meaning," and not all of them are straightforward atheists in the same philosophical sense. Still, they share the thought that the absence of a divinely guaranteed order does not automatically entail the impossibility of a meaningful human life.

The strongest version of the argument

The argument is not merely that people can distract themselves with hobbies while secretly living in an empty universe. Its stronger form distinguishes between meaning discovered as an objective feature of reality and meaning generated through a person's active participation.

On this view, meaning is not necessarily a property waiting to be found in the structure of the cosmos. It is more like the significance of a promise, a friendship, a work of art, or a political cause. Such things are not meaningless simply because their value is not written into the laws of physics. Their meaning exists through human consciousness, practices, relationships, and commitments.

Sartre's existentialism gives a particularly influential account. If there is no God to establish a fixed human nature or a universal moral script, then human beings are radically responsible for what they make of themselves. We are not born with a complete essence that determines our proper purpose. Through choices, projects, and commitments, we give shape to our lives. Sartre did not mean that every choice is equally admirable or that a person can escape criticism by declaring a private preference meaningful. His account includes responsibility to others and the recognition that choosing an image of humanity also expresses a view about what human beings may become.

Simone de Beauvoir developed a related but more ethically attentive view. Freedom is not exercised in isolation. Human beings are embodied, socially situated, and dependent upon one another. A meaningful project should therefore recognise the freedom of others rather than treating them merely as instruments. Meaning is created through action, but this does not make every project equally defensible.

Camus approached the issue through the idea of the absurd: human beings seek clarity, purpose, and unity, while the world does not obviously answer those demands. His response was not passive resignation. He defended lucid engagement with life, including love, struggle, artistic creation, and solidarity, without pretending that these activities receive a guarantee from the universe. Meaning, on this account, can be lived without being metaphysically certified.

The contrast between the "serious" person and the "passionate" person helps clarify two possible ways of responding to this situation. The serious person treats values as already established by some external structure: perhaps tradition, nation, social status, religious authority, or an allegedly objective system. Meaning is received rather than made. The passionate person recognises that the world does not simply hand over a purpose and therefore commits themselves to a chosen object or project. The passion may be directed toward knowledge, art, justice, family, political liberation, or some other concern.

This distinction is not a simple endorsement of impulsive enthusiasm. A passionate commitment can involve discipline, sacrifice, and years of work. The point is that its authority arises through a person's active appropriation rather than mere conformity to an inherited framework.

What gives the position real force

There is an important insight here. Even people who believe in objective value do not simply discover a life already arranged for them in the way one discovers a geographical fact. Meaning usually involves interpretation, decision, and participation. A person may accept that human life has an objective purpose and still need to determine how that purpose applies to a particular career, relationship, sacrifice, or historical situation.

The existentialist also exposes a weakness in a common argument against atheism: "If there is no God, life is meaningless." That conclusion does not follow merely from the premise that there is no God. It assumes that only a transcendent source could generate significance. But many valuable things depend upon human practices without being worthless for that reason. Language, promises, laws, music, friendship, and institutions are not physical ingredients of the universe, yet they can matter profoundly.

Contemporary philosophers who are atheists or naturalists often reject the popular slogan that life is therefore "just meaningless." Susan Wolf, for example, has argued that a meaningful life involves active engagement with projects of genuine worth, not merely the presence of subjective desire. Thaddeus Metz has explored ways of defending meaning in life within a broadly naturalistic framework. These approaches show that serious secular philosophy does not have to reduce meaning to whatever a person happens to enjoy at a given moment.

The strongest objection: chosen meaning may be arbitrary

The central challenge is that creating meaning may appear to confuse commitment with justification. A person can passionately devote themselves to a destructive ideology, abusive relationship, or empty status competition. If meaning is created simply by choosing and caring, then fanaticism and wisdom may be placed on the same level. A person could announce that domination is their life's purpose, but the announcement alone does not make domination meaningful in any admirable sense.

This objection becomes more serious when the existentialist language of freedom suggests that an individual can create values by sheer will. Human beings do not choose the conditions of their existence, their vulnerability to suffering, their historical setting, or many of the consequences of their actions. Nor can they simply decide that other people have no claims upon them. A theory that treats all commitments as equally valid risks collapsing into subjectivism, where "meaningful" means only "important to me."

There is also a psychological concern. People often need more than a self-authored project. They seek an assurance that their sacrifices matter even when they fail, that justice is not finally defeated by death, and that love is not rendered insignificant by impermanence. A created meaning may provide motivation during life without answering questions about ultimate significance. Someone who wants meaning that is independent of human attitudes may reasonably find existentialism incomplete.

The strongest existentialist reply

The strongest reply is that the criticism demands the wrong kind of validation. To say that meaning is created does not have to mean that it is arbitrary, private, or morally immune from criticism. Human-created meanings can be assessed by their coherence, their consequences, the quality of the relationships they sustain, and the extent to which they respect or damage other persons. A commitment to caring for children, seeking truth, or resisting oppression is not equivalent to a commitment to cruelty merely because both are human commitments.

Existentialists can also argue that an external source does not automatically solve the problem. If a value is meaningful because an authority commands it, one may still ask why that authority should be obeyed. If the authority is obeyed because it is good, then goodness appears to be doing explanatory work beyond the command. This does not refute objective theism, but it shows that appealing to an external source is not a complete substitute for explaining value.

Moreover, the existentialist can distinguish between subjective importance, intersubjective significance, and objective value. A project may be personally absorbing, socially valuable, or valuable independently of anyone's attitudes. The claim that human beings create meaning may be strongest at the first two levels and need not pretend to settle the third. A secular thinker can reasonably say that meaning is constituted through human responses while still defending standards that criticise selfishness, cruelty, and self-deception.

What the argument does and does not establish

The existentialist argument establishes, at most, that a meaningful human life does not obviously require a purpose explicitly built into the universe. It shows that the absence of a discovered cosmic purpose is compatible with lives organised around serious and valuable commitments. It also exposes the weakness of the claim that atheism by itself entails despair, moral indifference, or the impossibility of love.

It does not establish that there is no objective meaning. Nor does it prove that all self-chosen projects are equally good, that moral obligations are illusions, or that the desire for ultimate significance is irrational. The argument succeeds as a critique of a simplistic form of nihilism, but it leaves open the deeper metaphysical question of whether values are discovered, created, or grounded in some combination of objective reality and human participation.

Its most defensible conclusion is modest but substantial: even if meaning is not handed to us by the cosmos, human beings can live through commitments that are reasoned, demanding, shared, and worthy of devotion. Whether that is enough depends on what one means by "meaning." For those who require an objective and ultimate purpose, existential creation will seem incomplete. For those who distinguish cosmic purpose from lived significance, it offers a coherent alternative to nihilism without pretending to settle the whole debate.