Skeptical theism threatens ordinary moral reasoning and theistic expectations

Skeptical theism is usually presented as a response to arguments from evil. The argument from evil claims, roughly, that some suffering appears gratuitous: it seems not to be required for any greater good, to prevent a worse evil, or to preserve some morally sufficient condition. If a perfectly good and powerful God existed, the argument continues, such suffering would be unexpected. Therefore, the existence of apparently gratuitous evil is evidence against theism.

The skeptical theist does not usually deny that suffering is terrible, or even that some suffering appears gratuitous. The claim is epistemic rather than emotional: human beings are not in a good position to judge whether an evil is genuinely gratuitous. We have limited knowledge of the possible goods, consequences, connections, and constraints involved in the total history of the world. A pattern that looks pointless from our perspective may have a role we cannot see.

Stephen Wykstra has defended a version of this position through his discussion of the "condition of reasonable epistemic access" and the principle often called CORNEA. Michael Bergmann has developed a related form of skeptical theism, arguing that we should not assume that our inability to discern God's reasons is evidence that there are no such reasons. William Alston likewise emphasized the limits of human cognitive access to divine purposes. In their strongest form, these views do not say that anything could be justified. They say that the inference from "I cannot see a morally sufficient reason" to "there is no morally sufficient reason" is unreliable in this context.

The argument against skeptical theism

The objection examined here is that this strategy has consequences beyond the problem of evil. If the relevant relations between goods and evils are generally beyond our understanding, then we may be unable to identify which apparent evils are truly gratuitous. That threatens ordinary moral reasoning. When we see a child being tortured, a person being persecuted, or a preventable disease causing suffering, we normally take the situation as a reason for intervention. Yet if hidden goods may be connected to the suffering, intervention could unknowingly prevent a greater good.

The same concern can be put more formally:

  • We should prevent an apparent evil when we have good reason to believe that prevention is morally required.
  • But skeptical theism tells us that we are often unable to know whether an apparent evil is necessary for an unknown greater good.
  • Therefore, skeptical theism appears to weaken our grounds for intervention, blame, rescue, and resistance to injustice.

The problem is not merely that skeptical theism makes moral decisions difficult. Moral life already involves uncertainty. The more serious concern is that its central method seems to undermine a principle we use constantly: when no morally relevant justification for harm is visible, we should not infer that none exists with complete certainty, but we may still have sufficient reason to act. If skeptical theism rejects even that practical standard, it risks moral paralysis.

There is also a theological or explanatory consequence. Theists often argue that the world displays signs of divine purpose. Fine-tuning arguments, for example, appeal to the fact that the basic physical parameters appear to fall within a narrow range compatible with complex life. The argument does not require knowing every divine reason, but it does involve a judgment about what a creator would be expected to do. If our cognitive limitations prevent us from judging whether God would permit a particular evil, why should those same limitations not prevent us from judging whether God would select life-permitting conditions, communicate clearly, or act in other apparently purposeful ways?

This generates a consistency challenge. Skepticism about God's reasons may block an argument from evil, while confidence about God's likely actions supports fine-tuning or other arguments for design. A critic may say that one cannot invoke human ignorance when the evidence is unfavourable and then set it aside when the evidence appears favourable.

The strongest reply

The strongest reply distinguishes several claims that are often run together. Skeptical theism need not say that human beings know nothing about morality, that every apparent evil might be justified, or that evidence about God's actions is impossible. It can make a narrower claim: our grasp of the total connections between particular evils and possible goods is too limited for confident judgments about what a perfect God would permit.

There is a familiar analogy. A young child may not understand why a competent parent permits a painful medical procedure. The child's inability to see the reason does not establish that the procedure is pointless. The analogy is imperfect, since human parents are not omniscient and divine purposes may be far more difficult to assess, but it illustrates the relevant logical point. "I see no sufficient reason" does not entail "there is no sufficient reason."

Furthermore, practical moral reasoning does not normally require certainty that an intervention has no hidden costs. A doctor may treat a patient even though every treatment carries risks. A rescuer may save someone from immediate danger without proving that the person's continued life will produce the greatest possible value. Moral agents operate with duties, probabilities, and reasonable expectations, not with a complete map of all consequences. A skeptical theist can therefore say that uncertainty about ultimate divine reasons does not cancel ordinary duties grounded in compassion, justice, consent, and the prevention of serious harm.

This reply has real force. A limited form of skeptical theism is not obviously self-defeating. There is a genuine difference between claiming that we cannot know whether any particular evil is gratuitous and claiming that we cannot know what to do in a particular human situation. We may have strong moral reasons to intervene even while admitting that the complete consequences of intervention are unknowable. The view also blocks a simplistic version of the evidential argument from evil: the absence of a discernible reason is not automatically strong evidence that no reason exists.

The reply can also distinguish evidential standards. Fine-tuning arguments typically concern broad physical regularities and comparative hypotheses, not a detailed prediction about why a particular person suffers at a particular time. A theist might argue that theism gives us some reason to expect a life-permitting universe while also warning that God's reasons for permitting particular suffering are not transparent. The two judgments are not formally contradictory.

Where the reply is vulnerable

Nevertheless, the objection identifies a serious danger. If skeptical theism is stated too broadly, it can undermine the very habits of reasoning on which moral condemnation and humanitarian action depend. Consider the principle: when we have no indication of a morally sufficient reason for allowing severe harm, that absence is at least some evidence against the existence of such a reason. Everyday moral reasoning relies on something like this principle. We do not excuse a person's inaction merely because a hidden benefit might, for all we know, result from it.

The skeptical theist may answer that human agents and God occupy different epistemic positions. Humans must act under uncertainty, whereas the argument concerns what a perfect being would know and permit. But this answer must be developed carefully. If the hidden-reasons hypothesis makes our evidence almost entirely uninformative, then it threatens more than one argument from evil. It may also weaken claims that the world reveals divine wisdom, benevolence, or purposeful design. A general principle that our inability to see a reason is never significant would be too sceptical to coexist comfortably with many positive inferences about divine action.

There is a further issue concerning moral knowledge. We need not know every consequence of an act in order to know that some acts are wrong. Yet if apparently horrific suffering could regularly be required by unknown goods, it becomes difficult to explain why our moral judgments should retain their normal evidential authority. The skeptical theist can preserve practical rules by saying that we should follow our best moral evidence. But that concession means that appearances of gratuitousness are not wholly irrelevant. They may not establish the conclusion that the suffering is gratuitous, but they can still count against the existence of a morally sufficient reason.

The same moderation is important in the fine-tuning debate. Skeptical theism does not refute fine-tuning, and fine-tuning advocates are not necessarily inconsistent simply because they make some expectations about divine action. But the argument places pressure on the level of confidence that is warranted. If human cognitive limitations substantially weaken our ability to infer what God would permit, they may also weaken inferences about what God would choose. The impact depends on the details of the argument, including its probability assumptions and comparison with naturalistic hypotheses.

What this does and does not establish

The objection does not establish atheism. It does not show that skeptical theism is incoherent, nor does it prove that an all-knowing and perfectly good God does not exist. It also does not show that human moral reasoning collapses whenever hidden consequences are possible. The strongest versions of skeptical theism can preserve practical moral knowledge and can reasonably insist that the evidential argument from evil must not rely on an unjustified inference from "no known reason" to "no reason."

What the objection does establish is a significant consistency requirement. A theist who appeals to human ignorance to defuse arguments from evil should explain why that ignorance does not equally weaken positive arguments that depend on expectations about divine purposes. The theist should also distinguish ultimate explanatory ignorance from practical moral uncertainty, and should avoid language suggesting that no apparent evil is evidence of anything.

The result is therefore a limitation rather than a decisive refutation. Skeptical theism has genuine force against overly confident arguments from suffering. At the same time, an unrestricted version threatens ordinary moral reasoning and risks making God's actions too inscrutable for both negative and positive inferences. The intellectually stable position is narrower: our inability to discern a divine reason may defeat some claims of certainty, but it does not erase moral evidence, practical duties, or the need for consistency when assessing what the world should look like under theism.