The objection identifies a real philosophical difficulty, but it does not show that a timeless Creator and a temporal creation are incoherent. It mainly exposes the need to distinguish God's eternal will from the created event that begins with time.

The objection in its strongest form

Suppose God eternally intends to create a bicycle, and the bicycle is not eternal but begins to exist. The critic asks: how can an eternal, changeless intention produce a new event? If God's state before creation and His state after creation are both timeless, there seems to be no moment at which creation occurs. Yet if creation is an event, it appears to require a transition from "not created" to "created."

This is not a trivial objection. It presses on the exact point where some presentations of the Kalam argument use two ideas together: God is timeless without creation, but temporal once creation exists. The question is whether that account smuggles change into God.

What the distinction actually is

The argument need not say that God first existed in a timeless state, then waited, and finally changed into a temporal state. If time begins with the universe, there is no temporal interval called "before creation." There is only God, eternally, and then the first moment of created time.

God's willing and knowing the creation can be eternal, while the effect of that will begins at the first moment of time. The causal priority here is not temporal priority. It is like a timeless explanation of a temporal reality, though every analogy has limits. The bicycle need not be eternally present merely because God's knowledge and will of it are eternal.

Classical theologians expressed this by distinguishing God's eternal attribute and will from the changing relations of created things to Him. God does not acquire new knowledge or undergo an alteration in His essence. Rather, the creature begins to exist, and the created relation "this world exists" becomes true at the first moment of time.

"He is the First and the Last, the Ascendant and the Intimate, and He has knowledge of all things."

Quran 57:3

This is also consistent with the prophetic description:

"Allah was, and there was nothing besides Him."

Sahih al-Bukhari

What this does and does not establish

The reply does not prove that every philosophical version of Craig's hybrid account is perfectly formulated. Critics may reasonably ask whether an eternal free choice can have a temporal effect without a sufficient temporal explanation, or whether "timeless" divine agency is fully intelligible. Those are serious metaphysical questions.

But the objection does not establish a contradiction. It assumes that every cause must act through a change occurring in time, whereas the very issue is whether time itself has a beginning. Nor does it show that creation must be eternal merely because God's will is eternal. The Kalam argument establishes, if its premises succeed, that the universe has a beginning and therefore depends on a cause beyond it. It does not by itself explain every detail of divine timelessness, nor does it require that God undergo temporal change.

The central claim remains coherent: an eternal, free Creator can bring about a temporal world without the Creator being a temporal object inside that world.