The claim is striking: the Qur'an accuses some People of the Book of taking their religious scholars as "lords besides Allah", and rabbinic literature itself contains passages that appear to place rabbinic legal authority above even a heavenly voice. Is this a genuine point of contact, or an unfair reading of Jewish texts?
A careful answer must do two things at once: present the argument in its strongest form, and also state its limits. The result is not a simplistic "gotcha", but a serious sign that the Qur'an's critique was not vague abuse. It identified a real religious tendency: allowing human religious authority to function as if it could bind and unbind independently of God.
The Qur'anic charge in Qur'an 9:31
"They took their rabbis and their monks as lords besides Allah, and also the Messiah, son of Mary. Yet they were not commanded except to worship One God; there is no god except Him. Exalted is He above whatever they associate with Him."
At first glance, a reader may ask: did Jews and Christians literally bow down to rabbis and monks? The Qur'an itself often uses precise theological language, so how is "lords" meant here?
The most important early explanation is the report of Adi ibn Hatim, a former Christian who came to the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH). When he heard this verse, he objected that Christians did not worship their monks and priests. The Prophet (PBUH) explained that the issue was not prostration, but obedience in religious law.
Adi ibn Hatim said that he came to the Prophet (PBUH) while wearing a cross of gold, and he heard him reciting: "They took their rabbis and their monks as lords besides Allah." Adi said: "They did not worship them." The Prophet (PBUH) replied in meaning: "Did they not make lawful for them what Allah had made unlawful, and they made it lawful; and make unlawful for them what Allah had made lawful, and they made it unlawful?" He said: "Yes." The Prophet (PBUH) said: "That was their worship of them."
Reported by Jami' at-Tirmidhi, 3095. Al-Tirmidhi graded it hasan gharib; it is commonly cited by later scholars as hasan.
This hadith is crucial because it prevents a shallow reading. The Qur'an is not necessarily saying that every Jew or Christian consciously treated scholars as gods in a ritual sense. It is diagnosing a form of religious submission: when people accept human alteration of divine law as binding simply because a religious authority says so, that authority has been given a share of lordship.
The strongest version of the argument
The argument, as its proponents state it, is this:
- The Qur'an says some People of the Book took their rabbis and monks as lords besides Allah.
- The Prophet (PBUH) explained this as obeying religious authorities when they made the unlawful lawful and the lawful unlawful.
- Rabbinic literature itself contains passages where rabbinic authority is portrayed as decisive even over miraculous signs or a heavenly voice.
- Therefore, the Qur'an's critique is not an outsider's caricature. It corresponds to something visible inside the tradition's own legal self-understanding.
The key rabbinic text often cited is the famous story of the "oven of Akhnai" in Bava Metzia 59b. In the story, Rabbi Eliezer disputes with the sages about whether a particular oven is ritually pure or impure. Rabbi Eliezer calls upon miraculous signs to prove his view: a carob tree is uprooted, a stream flows backward, the walls of the study hall lean, and finally a heavenly voice declares that the law follows Rabbi Eliezer.
But Rabbi Joshua responds by quoting Deuteronomy 30:12: "It is not in heaven." The Talmud explains that once the Torah was given at Sinai, legal decisions are not determined by heavenly voices, but by the authorized interpretive process among the sages, including majority rule. The story then says that Rabbi Nathan later met Elijah and asked what God did at that moment. Elijah replied that God smiled or laughed and said: "My children have defeated Me; My children have defeated Me."
For a Muslim reader, the connection is immediately noticeable. Here is a rabbinic text portraying human legal authority as able to reject a heavenly voice in the name of the rabbinic process. If divine law can be treated as dependent on a scholarly mechanism that even a heavenly intervention cannot overrule, then the Qur'anic language of "taking rabbis as lords" appears, at minimum, to have a recognizable target.
A second set of texts adds to the impression. In Berakhot 6a, the Talmud speaks of God wearing tefillin, and discusses what is written in God's tefillin. Other rabbinic passages speak, in highly anthropomorphic or homiletical language, of God studying Torah. Proponents of the argument say that these texts portray Torah and rabbinic Torah-culture as so elevated that even God is depicted within its categories. In their reading, this is not merely reverence for revelation; it is a religious imagination in which the rabbinic-Torah system becomes supreme.
Put in its strongest form, the claim is not that every line of the Talmud is "worship of rabbis". Rather, it is that rabbinic Judaism developed an unusually strong doctrine of sage-authority, and that its own literature sometimes expresses this authority in dramatic terms. The Qur'an's criticism, then, is historically and conceptually plausible: it identifies the danger of religious experts becoming practical lawgivers in a way that competes with God's sole right to command.
The strongest reply from the other side
The strongest Jewish or academic reply is also important, and Muslims should state it fairly.
First, the oven of Akhnai story is not usually understood by Jewish interpreters as rabbis defeating God in a crude or rebellious sense. Rather, it teaches that God Himself gave the Torah to Israel with rules for interpretation and legal decision-making. Once the Torah is given, the proper human court must decide cases according to the Torah's own procedures. "It is not in heaven" means that law is not settled by private miracles, charismatic claims, or new revelations, but by disciplined legal reasoning.
In that reading, Rabbi Joshua is not saying, "We can overrule God." He is saying, "God commanded us to follow the legal process He gave." The statement "My children have defeated Me" is then understood affectionately: God rejoices that His children have mastered and applied the Torah according to the rules He entrusted to them.
Second, texts like "God wears tefillin" in Berakhot 6a are often read as homiletical, symbolic, or midrashic, not as literal theology. Classical Judaism strongly rejects corporeality in God, especially in later philosophical formulations such as those of Maimonides. A fair reading should not pretend that every rabbinic image is meant literally. Religious traditions, including Islam, contain figurative and rhetorical language; responsible interpretation asks how the tradition itself understands such language.
Third, rabbinic Judaism does not usually claim that rabbis may simply invent law without relation to revelation. Its claim is that the Written Torah and Oral Torah together form a divinely authorized legal system. From within that worldview, obedience to rabbinic authority is not worship of rabbis, but obedience to God's chosen structure of law.
This is the best counter-argument. It says: the Qur'anic critique may reflect the Islamic view of later Jewish authority, but it does not accurately describe how rabbinic Judaism understands itself. Rabbis are not "lords"; they are authorized interpreters within a God-given covenant.
The Muslim answer: where the Qur'anic critique still lands
The Muslim response does not need to deny these nuances. In fact, acknowledging them makes the argument stronger.
Islam also has scholars. Islam also has legal interpretation. Islam also recognizes consensus, analogy, juristic reasoning, and courts. The Qur'an commands believers to ask the people of knowledge when they do not know. Sunni Islam does not teach every individual to ignore scholarship and invent religion for himself.
So the issue cannot be "religious scholars have authority" in an absolute sense. The issue is the source, scope, and limits of that authority.
In Islam, scholars clarify, derive, and apply the law; they do not possess independent lordship over halal and haram. If a scholar's ruling clearly contradicts the Qur'an and authentic Sunnah, the ruling is rejected. No imam, jurist, saint, ruler, or institution can make pork lawful, abolish prayer, permit idolatry, or forbid what Allah has plainly allowed by claiming a religious authority equal to revelation.
This is exactly the point of the Adi ibn Hatim hadith. The Prophet (PBUH) did not define "taking lords" as merely respecting scholars. He defined it as accepting their power to reverse divine law.
Now return to Bava Metzia 59b. Even if one grants the Jewish interpretation - that the rabbis are following a divinely given process - the story still displays a striking elevation of institutional rabbinic authority. A heavenly voice supports one view, yet the accepted law follows the sages' process against that heavenly voice. From an Islamic theological perspective, that is precisely the kind of moment where the line between interpretation and independent norm-making becomes dangerous.
The Qur'an's critique, therefore, is not refuted by saying, "But rabbinic Judaism believes this authority was authorized by God." Many religious communities justify expansive clerical authority by claiming divine authorization. The Qur'anic question is more fundamental: did God in fact authorize human beings to bind consciences in that way, especially where their rulings alter or obscure what He revealed?
Muslims would answer no. The final revelation restores the principle that ultimate legislation belongs to Allah alone:
"Judgment belongs only to Allah. He has commanded that you worship none but Him. That is the upright religion, but most people do not know."
At the same time, Muslims should avoid an exaggerated claim. Bava Metzia 59b does not prove that Jews consciously worship rabbis. It does not prove that every rabbinic ruling is arbitrary. It does not even prove, by itself, that the Talmud teaches rabbis may knowingly contradict God. The more precise point is this: the Talmud contains a famous self-description in which rabbinic legal authority is portrayed as so binding that even a heavenly voice does not decide the law. That is highly relevant to Qur'an 9:31's diagnosis of misplaced religious obedience.
What this argument does and does not establish
What it does establish
- The Qur'anic charge is intelligible. Qur'an 9:31 is not making a random accusation. It addresses a real religious phenomenon: scholars functioning as practical determiners of divine law.
- The Prophetic explanation is precise. The Adi ibn Hatim hadith defines the issue as obedience in making halal haram and haram halal, not necessarily bowing to scholars.
- Rabbinic literature provides a meaningful parallel. The oven of Akhnai story in Bava Metzia 59b portrays rabbinic legal process as decisive even against a heavenly voice.
- The Qur'an shows insight into religious authority. It identifies a subtle form of shirk: not always statues and rituals, but surrendering God's legislative right to human authorities.
What it does not establish
- It does not prove that all Jews literally worship rabbis. The Qur'anic critique is about lordship in obedience and law, not necessarily ritual prostration.
- It does not require reading Talmudic imagery literally. Passages about God wearing tefillin or studying Torah are often understood within Jewish tradition as homiletical or symbolic.
- It does not remove the need for careful textual study. Rabbinic literature is vast, layered, and internally diverse. One should not reduce it to a slogan.
- It does not mean Islam rejects scholarship. Islam rejects giving scholars the right to override Allah, not the duty of learning from qualified scholars.
A sign worth reflecting on
For a sceptical reader, the force of this argument lies in its restraint. The Qur'an does not need to claim that Jews openly called rabbis "gods". Its point is subtler and more penetrating: a community can preserve the language of monotheism while allowing human authorities to occupy a divine function in law.
When the Talmud's own famous narratives present rabbinic decision-making as binding even in the face of a heavenly voice, the Qur'anic critique becomes difficult to dismiss as ignorance. A Muslim should still represent Judaism fairly, but the parallel is real. Qur'an 9:31 names a spiritual danger that religious communities repeatedly face: reverence for scholars turning into surrender of conscience, and interpretation turning into legislation.
The Islamic answer is not anti-scholarship. It is purified scholarship: learn from the people of knowledge, honor the inheritors of prophetic teaching, but reserve ultimate lordship for Allah alone. That balance is one of the Qur'an's enduring miracles of guidance.